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Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural
Safeguards and a Proposed Statutory Scheme
N. Richard Janis*
1. Introduction
In all fifty states,1 and in -the federal courts, 2 a person charged with a crime
cannot be tried if he is deemed incompetent to stand trial. Many jurisdic-
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. B.A., University
of Wisconsin, 1968; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.
The views presented in this article are those of the author alone and in no way
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United States Department of Justice. The author wishes to express his appreciation for
the assistance offered by Oscar Altshuler, Michael A. Pace, Albert H. Turkus, and the
staff of the Catholic University Law Review, particularly Roy Mason and Alan Siciliano,
in the preparation of this article.
1. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 425-26 (1959); ALAS. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.45.100 et
seq. (1962); Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01 (Supp. 1971), § 13-1622 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1301 et seq. (Supp. 1971), § 59-411 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. §8 1368 et seq. (West 1970), § 1374 (West Supp. 1972); CoLo. RE'V. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-6 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971);
FLA. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM. PROC. 1.210 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1501, -1504
(1972); HAwAII REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-91 to -92 (1968); IDAHO PENAL AND CORREC-
TION CODE §§ 18-404 et seq. (Session Laws 1971, ch. 143); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 1005-2-1 to -2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 783.1 et seq. (1950), §§ 783.3-.4 (Supp. 1972); KAN. CODE
CRIM. PROC. §§ 22-3301 et seq. (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM. PROC.
8.06 (1969); LA. STAT. ANN. CRIM. PROC. §§ 641 et seq. (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 23 et seq. (1972); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 15-16 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-13-11 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-504 et seq.
(1969); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1823 (Cum. Supp. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
178.400 et seq. (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17 (Supp. 1972), § 135:18
(1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:163-62 (1971), § 30:4-82 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-13-2.1 to -3.2 (1972); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. 88 658 et seq. (McKinney
1958), §§ 659-662b (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122-83 et seq.
(Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-01 to -02 (Supp. 1971); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2945.37-38 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 et seq. (1958),
§ 1167 (Supp. 1971); OE. REV. STAT. §§ 136.150 et seq. (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1352 (1964), tit. 50, §§ 4408-09 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-4-3 et
seq. (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-969 to -970 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 23-38-1 et seq. (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-604, -701 et seq. (Supp. 1972);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-
2 et seq. (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4821 et seq. (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN.
§8 19.1-228 et seq. (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.76.020 (Supp. 1970);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-9 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.13 (1958); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-241(c) (Supp. 1971). See also D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp.
1972). Delaware apparently has no statutory provision, but does follow the common
law rule. See Mills v. State, - Del. -, 256 A.2d 752 (1969).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244 etseq. (1970).
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tions have codified the common law standard of incompetence, s and close
examination reveals that in nearly all the others the courts in fact apply the
common law standard. 4 A person who is found incompetent to stand trial is,
in most states, 5 automatically committed to a state mental institution until
competency is restored and the judicial process is resumed. 6 Since most states
have not recognized that a determination of incompetency may lead to a
deprivation of liberty more severe than a prison sentence, safeguards com-
parable to those surrounding criminal conviction or involuntary civil commit-
ment are lacking.
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the conviction of an accused
person while he is legally incompetent violates due process, 7 this doctrine
had already been established by common law as a matter of fairness and
humanity to the defendant s Today, most courts still operate under the as-
sumption that an incompetency commitment is for the defendant's welfare.
But the cold reality is that this assumption frequently is not true.
The poor quality of care offered by many state institutions falls far short
of the treatment that committing judges seemingly assume committed de-
3. Under this standard, as popularly stated, a defendant is deemed competent if he
is able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist counsel
in the preparation of his defense. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 12.45.110 (1962);
ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-162'2 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (Perm.
Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE ENCYC.
ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972); KAN. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 22-3301 (Supp. 1971); LA. STAT. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 641 (1967);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.966 (11) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-504 (1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 662 (McKinney
Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-20-01 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §
136.150 (1971); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 74-21(c) (Supp. 1971). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970), and MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1368 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
1504 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1971); NEV. RE. STAT. §§ 178.405,
.460 (1968); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1352
(1964).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 426 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-411
(1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. §
24-301 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1502 (1972); IDAHO PENAL AND CORREC-
TION CODE § 18-406 (Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 143); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM.
PROC. 8.06 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-1823 (Cum. Supp. 1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 662b (McKinney Supp.
1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122-83 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-
20-2 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (1954); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-
969 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-5 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-231
(Supp. 1971).
6. Defendants who are found incompetent to stand trial are not protected against
lengthy pretrial incarceration by the constitutional right to a speedy trial. United
States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1956).
But cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972).
7. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
8. E.g., United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906); Youtsey v. United
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fendants will receive.0 All too frequently these institutions provide custodial
care, not therapy; 10 and thus at the outset there is almost no chance that
the defendant will receive the lind of attention required to regain compe-
tency.1' Institutionalization itself may also have a profound adverse psycho-
logical effect on a patient, particularly if the treatment that is offered is in-
adequate. 12  Many who might recover if given adequate treatment will ac-
tually suffer a deterioration in condition and may require institutionalization
indefinitely."5
Furthermore, a defendant may be further severely prejudiced, in a legal
States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). "The precept of forbidding trials of defendants
while they are insane evolved to insure fairness of procedure for the defendant." Foote,
A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitments of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
832, 844 (1960).
9. See Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Misuse of Psychiatry in the
Criminal Courts: Competency to Stand Trial, Circular Letter No. 392, at 3 (Feb.
1972): "As one surveys the demeaning and degrading conditions which exist in hos-
pitals for the criminally insane, the awful hypocrisy of our society and its system of
criminal justice stands revealed in the worst light imaginable."
10. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally ill, Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1963). The average ward patient in most public mental hospitals has per-
sonal contact with a physician only for about fifteen minutes each month. Hearings
on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 638-39,
pt. 1, at 43-44 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
11. "It is our contention that the vast majority of defendants now found incompetent
to stand trial could rapidly be returned to competence and so maintained if the facilities
and treatments of modem psychiatry were made available to them." GAP, supra note
9, at 34-35.
12. "[U]nder prevailing conditions, we super-impose new disabilities upon existing
disabilities-at least in many cases-when we forcibly commit sick people to places
called mental hospitals which in reality remain custodial asylums." 1961 Hearings,
pt. 1, at 44. See The Case of Bernard Goldfine, in J. KATZ, J. GoLoSTEIN & A. DERSHO-
VITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LAW 687 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KATz]. A
tragic example of the consequences of inadequate treatment was offered in the case of
forty-five year old Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Lynch. Having been
charged with passing bad checks, he was confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the
District of Columbia. On January 22, 1962 he wrote: "Frankly, the conditions here
are almost more than anyone can bear . . . the monotony-seventy-eight cents per day
per patient food budget, no laundry, and above all no treatment. This hospital . . .
is a human warehouse." On August 23, 1962, still without hope of early release and
facing civil commitment proceedings, Frederick Lynch committed suicide. See Arens,
Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally IlL The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch,
13 CATH. U.L. REV. 3, 38 & n.126 (1964).
13. See Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Community-Based Hospital as a Branch of a
State Hospital, in KATz 664: "[O]nce a patient has remained in a large mental hospital
for two years or more, he is quite unlikely to leave except by death. He becomes one
of the large mass of so-called 'chronic' patients." One study reported that more than
fifty percent of those found incompetent to stand trial would "spend the rest of their
lives confined to the Hospital." Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Pro-
cedures, Results, and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCH. 713 (1963). See also McGarry,
The Fate of Psychotic Offenders Returned for Trial, 127 AM. J. PSYCH, 1181 (1971).
[Vol. 23: 720
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sense, by commitment. He or his attorney might be able to prove his inno-
cence or establish a defense to the state's case,' 4 thereby making the ques-
tion of his incompetence irrelevant. However, since he is given no chance
to test the validity of the state's case, he may be confined although demon-
strably innocent of the crime. The unfairness involved is compounded when
the defendant is not provided the procedural safeguards,' 5 and -the state is
not required to meet the substantive standards'6 applicable to involuntary
civil commitment. In addition, the long delay before trial often created by
commitment 17 may result in the loss of essential evidence or impair the abil-
ity of the defendant to present a defense. While this delay also theatens
the prosecution's case, that fact hardly offsets the prejudicial effect on the
defense. On balance, commitment represents more of a threat to a defend-
ant, since facilities for gathering and preserving evidence are less readily
available to a committed person.' 8 And, of course, the possibility always
exists that the incompetency commitment will result in longer confinement
than conviction for the offense charged.' 9
Unfortunately, the courts and legislatures have, for the most part, failed
to examine whether legitimate state interests are served by commitment and
have continued to provide that a defendant who is found incompetent auto-
matically be committed. This practice demonstrates a failure to recognize
that the policies controlling whether a trial should be delayed are distinct
from those controlling whether a person should be involuntarily committed.
Whereas a trial should be delayed when the defendant cannot intelligently
14. Foote argues that this may be true in three different types of situations:
The first is the instance . . . where the defendant can show that the prosecu-
tion is barred as a matter of law; [an] example would be an indictment which
on its face discloses that the statute of limitations has run. Second are cases
where the defendant alleges that he can show an intrinsic defect in the prose-
cution's factual case which will prevent conviction, for example, that essential
evidence was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure or that the prosecu-
tion's evidence shows entrapment as a matter of law. Third, counsel for an in-
competent defendant may wish to assert an affirmative defense which can be
established without participation of the defendant. In a robbery prosecution
based on identification evidence, for example, counsel may be able to estab-
lish from employment records and the testimony of third parties that the
defendant was at work in another city at the time of the crime.
Foote, supra note 8, at 841.
15. Generally, there must be a full-fledged judicial proceeding, frequently including
the empaneling of a jury, at which the state must carry the burden of proof. Note,
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1288 (1966).
16. Generally, there must be a finding that the person is dangerous to himself or
others, or that he is in need of care and lacks the capacity to fend for himself. Id.
17. See, e.g., The Case of Tony Savarese, in KATZ, 634-50 (thirty-four year com-
mitment before arraignment).
18. Foote, supra note 8, at 842.
19. See note 13 supra.
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participate, the involuntary commitment of a person who has not been found
guilty of any crime should be authorized only where the necessity for con-
finement and the likelihood of effective treatment justify the loss of liberty.
If the psychiatric data indicates that an individual is never likely to regain
competence to stand trial, further commitment by the state and deprivation
of the individual's liberty cannot be justified as serving either ,the defendant's
welfare or a legitimate state interest. 20  If the individual can be treated on
an outpatient basis or by a private doctor, no necessity exists for confine-
ment and the resulting deprivation of freedom. Clearly, an individual not
in need of confinement as a means for treatment should not be committed
unless ,the state can make a showing which meets the standards of civil com-
mitment. Indeed, commitment of such persons might actually prevent re-
covery and, by unnecessarily crowding our institutions, deprive those in real
need of institutionalization of the attention and treatment they require. 2'
As most states are slow, to recognize the inadequacies and injustices of
present incompetency procedures, 22 it is not surprising that the impetus for
reform should come from the Supreme Court.
II. The Supreme Court's Response
The Supreme Court recently considered equal protection and due process
limitations on pretrial commitment of incompetent defendants in Jackson v.
Indiana,23 noting with respect to the state's power to order all types of com-
mitment, that "[cionsidering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps
remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have
not been more frequently litigated. ' '24
The Indiana statute25 provided that if the trial judge had reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant incompetent to stand trial, he should set
a date for a competency hearing and appoint two disinterested physicians
to examine -the defendant and testify as to their findings. The defendant
was entitled to introduce evidence at the hearing. If the court determined,
20. See The Motion to Dismiss Indictment in United States v. Pound, in KATZ 582.
Ezra Pound was indicted on November 26, 1945 for making treasonous broadcasts dur-
ing World War II. On February 13, 1946 he was found incompetent to stand trial and
was confined until the indictment was finally dismissed with the consent of the Govern-
ment in April, 1958, even though the likelihood of his committing further acts of
treason was almost nonexistent, his condition was incurable and would forever render
him incompetent, and he was not in need of institutional care.
21. See GAP, supra note 9, at 41. Such commitment, of course, also results in the
unnecessary expenditure of state funds.
22. See pp. 726-36 infra.
23. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
24. Id. at 737 (footnotes omitted).
25. IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1973).
[Vol. 23: 720
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on the basis of the evidence offered at the hearing, that the defendant lacked
"comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his de-
fense," the statute ordered the defendant remanded to the state department
of mental health for commitment to an "appropriate psychiatric institution"
until the superintendent of that institution certified to the court that the de-
fendant had been restored to competence. There was no statutory provision
for periodic review of the defendant's condition by either the court or mental
authorities, nor was the likelihood of the defendant's improvement a factor
to be considered in determining whether the defendant should be committed.
The petitioner, a twenty-seven year old mentally defective deaf mute who
could not read, write, or intelligently communicate, was charged with sep-
arate robberies of two women. But before any trial began the 'trial court
set in motion -the procedures for determining competency to stand trial. 26
The medical testimony at the competency hearing indicated that Jackson's
condition precluded his comprehension of the nature of the charges against
him or an effective participation in his defense. Further, the prognosis was
"dim" and it appeared that Jackson's intelligence was not sufficient to en-
able him to ever develop the necessary communicative skills. Nonetheless,
the court, finding Jackson incompetent, ordered him committed until such
time as he could be certified by the health department as "sane" and thus
possessing "comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and
make his defense."
The Supreme Court found that the record clearly established "that the
chances of Jackson's ever meeting the competency standards of § 9-1706a
are at best minimal, if not nonexistent. The record 'also rebuts any conten-
tion that the commitment could contribute to Jackson's improvement. Jack-
son's § 9-1706a commitment is permanent in practical effect."' 27 Moreover,
the Court compared the State's procedures for indeterminate commitment
of incompetent defendants with its procedures for commitment of the feeble-
minded 28 and for involuntary civil commitment, 29 and found their standards
substantially different. 30 The Court concluded:
. . . [W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient com-
mitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than
those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses,
26. Id.
27. 406 U.S. at 727.
28. IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1907 (Supp. 1973).
29. Id. at §§ 22-1201 to -1256 (Supp. 1973).
30. In particular, the Court emphasized that under the incompetency commitment
statute the state needed to show only the defendant's inability to stand trial to commit
him indefinitely, while under the involuntary civil commitment statute the state was
required to make a showing of at least (1) mental illness and (2) a need of "care,
1974]
Catholic University Law Review
and by thus condemning him in effect -to permanent institution-
alization without the showing required for commitment or the op-
portunity offered for release afforded by § 22-1209 or § 22-1907,
Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment.A'
The Court also found Indiana's provision for commitment of a criminal de-
fendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
We hold, consequently, that a person charged ,by a State with
a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his in-
capacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the rea-
sonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is
a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the
forseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case,
then the State must either institute the customary civil commi-
ment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely
any other citizen or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if
it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to
stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress
toward that goal.8 2
III. The Present Procedures
An examination of current state statutes reveals that there had been only
limited reform in this area of the law prior to the Jackson decision. Although
a few states have begun to show increasing awareness of the policy issues
involved and have moved to curb potential abuse,38 the majority of states
continue to operate under wholly inadequate systems that will have to be
revised to comport with the standards set forth in Jackson.
treatment, training or detention" (§ 22-1201), and under the feeble mindedness com-
mitment statute the state was required to make a showing that an individual is "unable
to properly care for [himself]" (§ 22-1801). Further, an individual committed as fee-
ble minded was eligible for release when his condition "justified it" (§ 22-1814), and
an individual involuntarily civilly committed could be released when the superintendent
of the institution discharged him, or when cured of the illness. On the other hand,
a criminal defendant committed as incompetent was not entitled to release until he was
able to stand trial, which in Jackson's case meant that it was unlikely that he would
ever be released.
31. 406 U.S. at 730 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 738 (footnote omitted). The Court also hinted (but did not decide) that
prolonged commitment might be violative of the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial, or might be a denial of due process in that criminal charges are held indefinitely
over one who may never have a chance to prove his innocence. Id. at 740 (footnotes
omitted).
33. See, e.g., IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE §H 18-404 to -406 (Sess. Laws
1971, ch. 143); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 59, § 23-24 (1972); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-504 to -507 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, H8 4821-22 (Supp. 1972).
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Typical of the procedures outlined in most of the state laws is the Dis-
trict of Columbia statute.3 4 Like those of most states,3 5 the District of Colum-
bia statute allows the court to commit temporarily, for observation and exam-
ination, a defendant whose competency to stand trial is in doubt. Unfortu-
34. D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972) states in part:
(a) If it appears to a court having jurisdiction of-
(1) a person arrested or indicted for, or charged by information with an
offense, or
(2) a child subject to a transfer motion to the Family division of the Su-
perior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to section 16-2307,
that from the court's own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted
to it and prior to the imposition of sentence, the expiration of any period of
probation, or the hearing on the transfer motion, as the case may be, such
person or child (hereafter in this subsection and subsection (b) referred to
as the "accused") is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his
own defense, the court may order the accused committed to the District of
Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court,
for such reasonable period as the court may determine for examination and
observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric
staff of said hospital. If after such examination and observation, the super-
intendent of the hospital . . . shall report that in his opinion the accused is
of unsound mind or mentally incompetent, such report shall be sufficient to
authorize the court to commit by order the accused to a hospital for the men-
tally ill unless the accused or the Government objects, in which event, the
court, after hearing without a jury, shall make a judicial determination of the
competency of the accused to stand trial or to participate in transfer proceed-
ings. If the court shall find the accused to be then of unsound mind or men-
tally incompetent to stand trial or to participate in transfer proceedings, the
court shall order the accused confined to a hospital for the mentally ill.
(b) Whenever an accused person confined to a hospital for the mentally ill
is restored to mental competency in the opinion of the superintendent of said
hospital, the superintendent shall certify such fact to the clerk of the court
in which the indictment, information, or charge against the accused is pending
and such certification shall be sufficient to authorize the court to enter an
order thereon adjudicating him to be competent to stand trial or to participate
in transfer proceedings, unless the accused or the Government objects, in
which event, the court, after hearing without a jury, shall make a judicial de-
termination of the competency of the accused to stand trial or to participate
in transfer proceedings.
(g) Nothing herein contained shall preclude a person confined under
the authority of this section from establishing his eligibility for release under
the provisions of this section by a writ of habeas corpus.
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970); ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 12.45.100 (1962); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971);
D.C. ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-91 (1968);
IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE § 18-405 (Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 143); KAN. CODE
CRIM. PROC. §§ 22-3302 (Supp. 1971); LA. STAT. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 644 (1967);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11)
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-505
(1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82
Supp. 1971); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 660 (McKinney Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 136.150 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-6 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822
(Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-228 (Supp. 1971). See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.05 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
1974]
Catholic University Law Review
nately, these "temporary" commitments may be for extended periods since
frequently no observation or examination is even begun until the defendant
has been at the institution for quite some time.86 Even in those states that
place a time limit on the temporary commitment, extensions are frequently
allowed.87  Only a few states specifically provide that these examinations
may, when possible, be conducted on an outpatient basis. 38 Normally, a
defendant so committed is given no opportunity to challenge this depriva-
tion of his freedom either on grounds that outpatient or private observation
would suffice as an alternative to confinement, or on grounds of undue de-
lay.89
The District of Columbia statute is also typical in its failure to recognize
that the policy interests involved in the determination of incompetency differ
from those involved in the determination of whether the defendant should
be committed. As in the majority of states, a finding of incomptency auto-
matically leads to commitment until recovery.40 There is no inquiry re-
quired into the questions of whether, in fact, recovery of competency to
stand trial is ever likely to occur; whether, if competency can be restored,
the defendant will receive the therapeutic treatment that is required to do
so; or whether there are alternatives to confinement such as outpatient treat-
36. 1961 Hearings, pt. 2, at 699-700, 717-18.
37. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-91 (1968) (temporary commitment of
ten days or until completion of the examination); IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE
§ 18-405 (Session Laws 1971, ch. 143) (temporary commitment for not more than
sixty days or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 95-505 (1969) (temporary commitment for not longer than sixty days
or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4822 (Supp. 1972) (temporary commitment for not more than sixty days with
extensions of fifteen days). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) (temporary commitment for not more than sixty days or such longer pe-
riod as the court determines to be necessary).
38. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §
15 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV,. STAT. § 136.150
(1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822 (Supp. 1972).
In the District of Columbia outpatient examination has been specifically provided by
case law. In Marcey v. Harris, 400 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the United States
Court of Appeals held that pretrial commitment under § 24-301 (a) is only for purposes
of a pretrial examination and is not a ground for bail denial, otherwise contemplated
under the bail statute. Thus, upon the request of the accused, his commitment for a
pretrial mental examination should be limited to an examination on an outpatient basis,
unless the court is advised by the hospital authorities, setting forth reasonable grounds,
that inpatient commitment is necessary to assure effective examination.
39. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01 (Supp. 1971), 1 13-1622 (1956);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §8 178.400 et seq.
(1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-969 to -970 (Supp. 1971). But see Guy v. Ciccone,
439 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1971) where the court found "highly inappropriate" an eighty-
nine day confinement of the defendant for the purpose of observation as to his compe-
tency to stand trial; MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 (1972).
40. See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
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ment or private care.41  Nor are defendants who face commitment granted
the procedural and substantive safeguards guaranteed in involuntary civil
commitment proceedings.
Even before Jackson, however, some states were beginning to demonstrate
an increasing awareness of the need to explore these considerations and of
the distinct issues presented by commitment following a determination of in-
competency. A few states specifically provide that the issues of incompe-
tence and commitment should be determined separately, 42 and a number of
others no longer automatically require commitment after it is determined
that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial.43 Some states authorize the
courts to provide for alternatives to commitment that may or may not be
tied to outpatient or private treatment;44 others now provide that a defend-
ant found to be incompetent is not to be confined unless he is dangerous
to himself or others. 45 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in dis-
cussing that state's incompetency commitment statute:
A determination that persons are unfit to stand trial is persuasive
on the question of whether they should be confined under NJS
30:4-82. However, this statute only authorizes confinement of
persons who are a hazard to themselves or others, persons who
41. However, the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (1967), that a person involuntarily com-
mitted to an institution, on being acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity, has
a right to treatment, and that continued confinement cannot be justified if he is not
receiving therapy, would appear to offer support for incompetent defendants who chal-
lenge their confinement on this ground. Moreover, in Ashe v. Robinson, 450 F.2d 681
(D.C. Cir. 1971), the court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity
is entitled not only to treatment, but to treatment under the least restrictive, alternative
approach consistent with the legitimate purposes of commitment. Cf. Miller v. Over-
holser, 206 F.2d 415, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
42. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4827 (Supp. 1972).
43. See notes 44-45 infra. See also United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1963), in which the court held that there were not sufficient grounds for commitment
where the defendant demonstrated that he would receive private psychiatric care that
was likely to restore his competency, even though the state intended to provide effective
and beneficial treatment.
44. See, e.g., KAN. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-3303 (Supp. 1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp.
1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 24 (1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.160 (1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4829 (Supp. 1972). See
also, The Case of Bernard Goldfine, in KATZ 687, in which the court ordered an incom-
petent defendant released on condition that he undergo outpatient psychiatric treatment,
after it concluded that the institutional care he was receiving was not improving his con-
dition, that he was not dangerous to himself or others, and that if he were not confined
he could pay for and would receive treatment more likely to bring about recovery.
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); IowA CODE
ANN. § 783.3 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1167 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23-38-6(1967); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1973). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 (1970); United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (4th Cir. 1969).
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cannot fend for themselves. It is not a blanket authorization to
commit persons with any condition of mental illness or retardation
.... Since the statute authorizes confinement of a person and
loss of his freedom, the courts must be careful to see that the stat-
ute is not used as a catch-all device to punish persons under indict-
ment without an adjudication of guilt at a criminal trial. The stat-
ute does not turn on guilt or innocence of a criminal charge, but
on the need of the individual or society for protection. 46
An increasing number of states have taken steps to ensure that defendants
need not have recovered before seeking release from commitment. Some
states now give a defendant committed for incompetency a status similar to
individuals who have been involuntarily civilly committed 47 and, if he is not
dangerous to himself or others,48 nor in need of inpatient care, and able to
fend for himself,4 9 allow his release from custody.50 Michigan has taken
a forward step by requiring civil commitment proceedings to be brought if
it is likely that the defendant cannot recover competence to stand trial within
eighteen months, or if after eighteen months of commitment, the defendant
has not regained competence. 51
The District of Columbia statute, on the other hand, sets no maximum
time limit for an incompetency commitment, and in this respect also is typ-
ical.52 It reflects a failure to recognize that many individuals will never re-
gain competence, or at least that their chances of regaining competence are
too remote to justify continued deprivation of liberty. To hold these indi-
viduals indefinitely not only serves no legitimate state interest but may also
lead to a deterioration in their condition and the imposition of what is essen-
tially a life sentence.53 Thus, there is a danger that commitment is merely
46. State v. Caralluzzo, 49 N.J. 152, 228 A.2d 693, 695 (NJ. 1967) (footnote
added). Interestingly, while it is a forward step to recognize that defendants found
incompetent to stand trial should not automatically be committed, this approach may
be open to criticism on the ground that it fails adequately to take account of the legi-
timate state interest in commitment-to restore the defendant to competency so he may
be tried-and does not ensure treatment for the defendant.
47. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4829 (Supp. 1972), which explicitly gives a de-
fendant committed for incompetency the same status as an individual who has been
involuntarily civilly committed, including the right to receive care and treatment, and
to be discharged.
48. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1374 (West Supp. 1972); LA. STAT. ANN.
CRIM. PROC. § 648 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 24, 28 (1972); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972).
49. See, e.g., KAN. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-3304 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4829 (Supp. 1972).
50. But see State v. Lewis, 11 N.C. App. 226, 181 S.E.2d 163 (1971), where the
court held that a finding that commitment is in the best interest of the defendant or for
the protection of society is not required.
51. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(1) (1972).
52. See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
53. See notes 13 & 19-21 supra, and accompanying text.
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being used as a form of punishment for those who have not been tried,54
or as an expedient-and less restricted-alternative to civil commitment. 55
In this area there had been some reform even before Jackson, when cer-
tain states began to recognize the injustice involved in indeterminate commit-
ments, but it has been limited and not wide spread. The federal courts
have imposed a "rule of reasonableness" upon -the federal incompetency
commitment statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244 et seq.56 which the Supreme
Court summarized in Jackson:
Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed under [c§ 4244
et seq.] can be held only for a "reasonable period of time" neces-
sary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of his at-
taining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. If the
chances are slight, or if the defendant does not in fact improve,
then he must be released or granted a § § 4247-48 hearing.5 7
A -few state statutes set, or require a committing court to set, a maximum
period of commitment. 58  After this period has expired, any further com-
mitments must be in accordance with the procedures for involuntary civil
commitment.59 New York requires release of defendants charged with mis-
demeanors after ninety days of commitment, and release and dismissal of
charges against defendants charged with felonies after they have been com-
mitted for two-thirds of the maximum sentence for the offense charged. 0
Once the charges against the defendant have been dropped, the rationale
for incompetency commitment, restoration of the defendant to a condition
in which he can intelligently participate in trial, no longer exists. Some states
have explicitly recognized this by requiring the defendant to be released or
civilly committed if the indictments have been dismissed.61 In addition, a
54. See the discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Caralluzzo, 49
N.J. 152, 228 A.2d 693, 695 (1967), pp. 729-30 & note 46 supra.
55. See Foote, supra note 8, at 832-33.
56. See 406 U.S. at 733 and cases cited therein.
57. Id. at 733. 18 U.S.C. § 4247-48 (1970) permit commitment of federal prison-
ers whose sentences are about to expire if the prisoner is (1) insane or mentally incom-
petent, (2) would be dangerous if not committed and (3) suitable arrangements for
custody are not available in a state facility.
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971) (maximum period of
commitment not to exceed the maximum sentence for the offense charged); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972) (six months with one year extension);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972) (eighteen months).
59. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. Ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972).
60. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 730.50 (McKinney 1958). See also ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 104-3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
61. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 12.45.110 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020
(Supp. 1971); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 662b (McKinney Supp. 1970). In the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the established practice is to release a defendant who has been com-
mitted as incompetent if the indictment is dismissed. The rationale is that the com-
mitment order was an order in the criminal case and that once the criminal case is
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number of states allow the court to dismiss the charges if so much time has
passed that a trial would be unjust. 62 Finally, a few states permit a defend-
ant who has been committed as incompetent to apply for release in the same
manner as those who have been involuntarily civilly committed.63
Like nearly all state statutes, 64 -the District of Columbia statute does not
make provision for an incompetent defendant, through his counsel, to test
the merits of the state's case. In the Model Penal Code, the American Law
Institute suggests adoption of a provision whereby: "The fact that the de-
fendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude any legal objection to the pros-
ecution which is suceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without
the personal participation of the defendant. '65 Montana has adopted this
provision."6 As an alternative, the Model Penal Code suggests a statutory
provision for a special post-commitment hearing if the defendant's counsel
certifies to the court that he believes that the defendant has a defense on
the merits to the crime with which he is charged. 67 Idaho has adopted this
dismissed the order no longer has any effect. Contra, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123,
§ 16 (Supp. 1972).
62. See, e..g, IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE § 18-406 (Sess. Laws 1971, ch.
143); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 24 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-506
(1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 662b (McKinney Supp. 1970). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
63. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 24 (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4829
(Supp. 1972).
64. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 425-26 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-
1301 et seq. (Supp. 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1368 et seq. (West 1970), §
1374 (West Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1973); KAN. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-3301 et seq. (Supp.
1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 23 et seq. (1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123,
§ 15-16 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. §
99-13-11 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.400 et seq. (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135:17 (Supp. 1972), § 135:18 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:163-62 (1971), §
30:4-82 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 658 et seq. (McKinney 1958), §§
659-662b (McKinney Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 136.150 et seq. (1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-4-3 et seq. (1968); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02
(Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4821 et seq. (Supp. 1972). See also 18
U.S.C. §§ 4244 et seq. (1970).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 alternative subsection (3) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962). In Jackson the Supreme Court stated:
Both courts and commentators have noted the desirability of permitting some
proceedings to go forward despite the defendant's incompetency. . . . We do
not read this Court's previous decisions to preclude the States from allowing,
at a minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as in-
sufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions through coun-
sel.
406 U.S. at 740-41 (footnotes omitted).
66. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-506 (1969).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 alternative subsections (3), (4) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962):
[(3) At any time within ninety days after commitment as provided in Sub-
section (2) of this Section, or at any later time with permission of the court
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alternative.68  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in State v. McCredden,6 9
has also opened the door to an examination of the merits of the state's case
prior to prolonged commitment. There, the court concluded that
the proper procedure to be followed by the circuit court, where
a defendant is bound over by the magistrate to determine the issue
of insanity,70 is to hold a hearing to establish whether it is prob-
able that he committed the felony charged in the information.
The information should first be filed but no plea thereto should
be required. If the defendant is without counsel, counsel should
be provided with the right to cross-examine the state's witnesses
and to call witnesses on behalf of the defendant. At the conclu-
sion of this hearing a finding should be made on the issue of prob-
able guilt. If this finding is in the affirmative then the court shall
proceed to determine the insanity issue. If on the other hand the
finding is that the state has failed to prove the probability that
the defendant has committed the felony charged in the informa-
granted for good cause, the defendant or his counsel or the Commissioner of
Mental Hygiene . . . may apply for a special post-commitment hearing. If
the application is made by or on behalf of a defendant not represented by
counsel, he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel, and
if he lacks funds to do so, counsel shall be appointed by the Court. The ap-
plication shall be granted only if the counsel for the defendant satisfies the
Court by affidavit or otherwise that as an attorney he has reasonable grounds
for a good faith belief that his client has, on the facts and the law, a defense
to the charge other than mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.]
[(4) If the motion for a special post-commitment hearing is granted, the
hearing shall be by the Court without a jury. No evidence shall be offered
at the hearing by either party on the issue of mental disease or defect as a
defense to, or in mitigation of, the crime charged. After hearing, the Court
may in an appropriate case quash the indictment or other charge, or find it
to be defective or insufficient, or determine that it is not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the evidence, or otherwise terminate the proceedings on
the evidence or the law. In any such case, unless all defects in the proceed-
ing are promptly cured, the Court shall terminate the commitment order...
and order the defendant to be discharged or, subject to the law governing the
civil commitment of persons suffering from mental disease or defect, order the
defendant to be committed to an appropriate institution .... ]
68. IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE §§ 18-406 to -407 (Sess. Laws 1971, ch.
143). The preferability of this post-commitment procedure to a pretrial determination
of the state's case seems questionable. First, by requiring the defendant to wait until
after commitment to raise, through his counsel, a defense on the merits, the state may
be requiring the defendant to suffer an unnecessary and unjustifiable deprivation of his
freedom until the hearing is applied for, granted, and conducted. Second, it is quite
possible that a defendant, once committed, will not himself be sufficiently knowledge-
able or assertive to make the application for a post-commitment hearing, or fully under-
stand his right to do so; and he may not, at that time, have anyone to assist him.
Third, in those states which do not automatically commit incompetent defendants, re-
stricting the right to defend on the merits to those under commitment means that in-
competent defendants who are not committed will not have an opportunity to test the
state's case.
69. 33 Wis. 2d 661, 148 N.W.2d 33 (1967).
70. The issue in the case revolved around whether the defendant "was legally insane
and unable to stand trial." Id. at 669, 148 N.W.2d at 35 (footnote added).
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tion, or all of the felonies charged if there is more than one, the
defendant should be discharged subject to the right of the court
to temporarily detain him so as to permit civil proceedings to be
instituted .... 71
Unfortunately, other states have been slow to recognize the anomaly and
injustice of committing a defendant as incompetent to stand trial when he
can presently prove his innocence. Clearly, there is no legitimate state in-
terest involved when this -is the case. 72
Finally, the District of Columbia statute is typical in that it places the
decisional responsibility regarding release from commitment upon the super-
intendent of the institution, 73 though it does provide -for release through ha-
beas corpus also. 74 In some states, certification by the superintendent is fol-
lowed by a judicial hearing on the defendant's competency, 75 but in others
it is deemed conclusive. 76  Although at first blush it might appear that the
superintendent is in the best position to observe the defendant and report
on his condition, there are a number of problems involved in reliance upon
-his discretion. First, competency is a legal question and ought to be deter-
mined in a judicial proceeding.77  Indeed, there is evidence that psychia-
71. Id. at 670, 148 N.W.2d at 37-38.
72. See Foote, supra note 8, at 844.
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 426 (1959); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1622 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1372 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-6 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 54-40 (Supp. 1971);
D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM. PROC.
1.210 (1968); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. § 783.4
(Supp. 1972); LA. STAT. ANN. CRIM. PROC. §§ 648-49 (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REV. STAT. § 178.450 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-82 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3.1 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 29-20-02 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1167 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 139.160 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-706 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-48-5 (1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-9 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-241(c)
(Supp. 1971).
74. Reliance on habeas corpus is inadequate protection. The lack of legal sophisti-
cation of many defendants and the difficulty of retaining counsel and initiating legal
proceedings while institutionalized make the right to bring habeas corpus insufficient
to ensure against prolonged confinement. See Lewin, Disposition of the Irresponsible:
Protection Following Commitment, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 721 (1968); Note, Incompetency
to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 471 (1967). For examples of habeas corpus stat-
utes see 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (1970); D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971).
75. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM. PROC. 1.210
(1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-
13-3.1 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-20-02 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §
139.160 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-5 (1955).
76. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1972) (unless the govern-
ment or defendant objects); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1971).
77. "The psychiatrist can best perform his function if he presents relevant informa-
tion to the court without himself attempting to relieve the court of its difficult legal
question." GAP, supra note 9, at 28.
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trists frequently misunderstand the test of incompetency, 7s or become con-
fused in its application. 9 Moreover, the present system may impose a re-
sponsibility upon the superintendent that can prove administratively burden-
some and ethically problematic.8 0 Second, given the understaffed conditions
of most state mental institutions, it is quite possible that a defendant will
rarely, if ever, be examined with the thoroughness required 'to determine
whether he has recovered competency. He may become "lost" in the in-
stitution, his condition becoming chronic as his stay becomes more perma-
nent.81 A number of states have, at least to some extent, reduced their re-
liance upon the superintendent. For example, some states have set maxi-
mum periods of commitment,8 2 others require periodic reports to the court, 83
and a few require civil commitment proceedings to be instituted if the de-
fendant has not been able to recover after a specified period of time.8 4
Moreover, a number of federal courts had concluded even before Jackson
that a committing court has a duty to inquire into the defendant's condition
from time to time, 5 and that commitment should not be continued if the
defendant is unlikely to recover. 88
Nevertheless, present procedures for dealing with a defendant whose com-
petency to stand trial is in doubt are, for the most part, wholly inadequate.
In the majority of jurisdictions there is no statutory awareness of the dis-
78. Oliver, Remarks, Panel on Recognizing and Determining Mental Competency to
Stand Trial-Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 155, 158-60 (1964).
79. See GAP, supra note 9, at 26-34.
80. One such ethical dilemma arises when submission of the defendant to the crimi-
nal process would conflict with his need for therapy.
81. See note 13 supra.
82. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972).
83. See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. ANN. § 12.45.110 (1962) (periodic); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1971) (six months); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1972) (not more than ninety days after original commitment); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972) (annually); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 24 (1972)
(annually); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-232 (Supp. 1971) (periodic).
84. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (Supp. 1972); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
28.966(11) (1972).
85. See, e.g., In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970) (frequent reports should
be required at stated intervals); Hast v. Ciccone, 287 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mo. 1968);
Arco v. Ciccone, 252 F. Supp. 347 (D. Mo. 1965), affd, 359 F.2d 796 (8th Cir.
1966); Smith v. Settle, 211 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mo. 1962); Johnson v. Settle, 184 F.
Supp. 103 (D. Mo. 1960).
86. See pp. 738-39 infra. The problems of incompetency law reflect a basic ambiva-
lence in society's attitude toward mentally ill criminal offenders. On the one hand,
there is a feeling that persons who are mentally disabled ought to be sheltered from the
severity of the criminal process while, on the other, there is a desire to protect society
by confining and punishing persons thought guilty of criminal conduct. While the
first objective has led to a progressive expansion of the class of persons considered
incompetent, the second has motivated an insistence that they be automatically com-
mitted to institutions for the criminally insane. Although this system has been ra-
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tinct policies involved in the need for delaying a trial because of the inabil-
ity of a defendant to participate intelligently, as opposed to the need of
the individual -for, or the interest of the state in confinement of the defend-
ant to an institution. This unawareness has led to a system that provides
inadequate protection against unwarranted deprivations of liberty and offers
the potential for abuse and injustice."' Even in those states where
an awareness of these realities has sparked reform, the changes have not
been sufficiently comprehensive.88
IV. A Suggested Procedure
In order to ensure that the rights of criminal defendants are protected,
while at the same -time ensuring that legitimate state interests are vindicated,
any pretrial commitment procedure should be limited in the following ways:
(1) Temporary commitments for observation should be for the shortest
duration possible and should be authorized only where confinement is nec-
essary and examinations cannot be conducted on an outpatient basis. The
defendant should be placed in the institution only when the staff is ready
to examine him, and the examination should begin at once. In no event
should any temporary commitment be for more than ten days, and the de-
fendant should expressly be given the right, and the procedure provided, to
challenge temporary commitment as being unnecessary or as creating undue
delay. Moreover, after the examination is completed, the defendant should
be returned to the court, there to be confined or released on bail pending
a determination of his competency. These requirements will ensure that the
device of temporary commitment will not be abused by the courts,89 but will
be employed only where a legitimate state interest requires it. Further, they
will ensure that temporary commitment will not be used as a device for con-
fining defendants when bail would otherwise be authorized, and that any
commitments that are necessary will be kept within stated time limits. 0 Fi-
tionalized by the assumption that commitment is more humane than criminal convic-
tion, the contradictions inherent in its objectives have been repeatedly demonstrated by
the actual consequences for incompetent defendants. Not only has a broad application
of incompetency law failed to mitigate the operation of the criminal process, but in
many instances it has caused hardship more severe than criminal conviction.
87. See Harvard Note, supra note 74, at 472.
88. There is currently pending before Congress legislation which provides a substan-
tial measure of reform in the procedural safeguards available to criminal defendants
in the federal courts. See S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
89. In 1971 in Massachusetts, only seventy-four out of 1806 pretrial admissions to
state mental hospitals were eventually found to be incompetent. GAP, supra note 9, at
40.
90. See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
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nally, this proposal calls for prompt return of the individual to the court,
and impedes the use of our state mental hospitals as jails or holding insti-
tutions.91 The responsibility should be -placed on the state to make a swift
determination as to the defendant's competency, and then to deal with him
according to law.
(2) The defendant should be given an opportunity to challenge the valid-
ity of the state's charges before he is committed; if he can prove them in-
valid, he should be released or temporarily detained for civil commitment
proceedings. Clearly, it is anomalous to "protect" the defendant from the
criminal process and confine him until he can assist in his own defense when
his attorney can presently prove the invalidity of the state's charges without
the participation of the defendant. One way to provide for such a demon-
stration would be to have -the trial on the merits first, followed by a determi-
nation of competency only if the defendant is found guilty.92 If the defend-
ant is found incompetent, the verdict would be set aside and treated as a
nullity. An advantage of this procedure is that the behavior of the defend-
ant during trial would provide extensive evidence as to his competence and
allow the judge or jury to base their application of the legal test on their
own observations rather than being forced to rely almost exclusively on psy-
chiatric testimony and prediction.93 On the other hand, the cost of conduct-
ing so many trials in which verdicts would be set aside raises a practical
objection to this proposal, particularly in light of the fact that our judicial
system is already greatly overloaded. 4  Perhaps a more practical way to
91. See Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1971) (eighty-nine day confine-
for observation).
92. In the analogous situation of acquittal by reason of insanity, some states have
a trial on the merits first and inquire into insanity at the time of the offense only if
the defendant is found guilty in the first trial. See, e.g., AIuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1621.01 (Supp. 1971).
93. See Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1965), where events dur-
ing the trial cast doubt on the defendant's competency. Some of the dangers inherent
in the reliance by judges and juries on expert psychiatric testimony in interpreting legal
standards are discussed in Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That
Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 29 (1968).
94. Harvard Note, supra note 74, at 469. The objection might also be raised that it
is anomalous to inquire into whether the defendant will be competent to stand trial after
he has already, in fact, stood trial. If he is incompetent then the trial was itself unfair
and the defendant has been subjected to precisely that which incompetency commitment
was intended to avoid-a trial at which he was unable to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him or to effectively assist his counsel in preparing a defense. This
objection overlooks two points, however. First, the post-trial hearing would not be one
to determine whether the defendant will be competent but rather to determine whether,
during the preceding trial, he was competent. Rather than relying solely on psychiatric
data and expert testimony to make a prediction about future behavior, the court may
refer to some extent to the defendant's behavior during trial, and thus make a judgment,
at least partially, on the basis of behavior it has observed. Second, it must be reem-
phasized that the primary purpose behind a determination of incompetency is to protect
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provide a means for the defendant to test the state's case would be to have
a pretrial probable guilt hearing prior to a resolution of the competency is-
sue, along the lines suggested by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State
v. McCredden.95 Finally, the defendant could be allowed to challenge the
validity of the state's charges after a determination of incompetency but be-
fore commitment.90 Of course, all of these alternatives are dependent upon
forceful representation of the defendant's interests by his counsel. Thus,
counsel should be provided during such procedures if the defendant cannot
afford or is otherwise unable to retain private counsel.97
,(3) A defendant, even when found to be incompetent, should be com-
mitted only when necessary to serve a legitimate state interest and only for
a specified period of time. There is no legitimate state interest in commit-
ment of an incompetent defendant if commitment is unlikely to lead to re-
covery or if there are alternative means of treatment that result in a less
substantial deprivation of liberty. Thus, before any defendant is criminally
committed, the court should be required to make a determination that it is
not unlikely that the defendant, if given proper treatment, will regain com-
potency; that such treatment cannot be administered on an outpatient or pri-
vate basis; and that the type of treatment required is available and will be
administered at the institution to which the defendant is to be committed.
If commitment cannot be justified as a necessary and likely means to restore
competency, the defendant should be released-subject to the right of the
court to order outpatient treatment or private care-or be civilly committed.
the defendant from an unfair trial resulting in a determination of guilt. The defendant
is protected since he is faced with a no-loss proposition: if his attorney can prove him
innocent, with or without his assistance, he need not face the problem of incompetency
commitment; if he is found guilty but is deemed to have been incompetent, the verdict
is set aside and treated as a nullity. Another, and perhaps more serious objection
might be that judges who have sat through an entire trial and who have been convinced
of the defendant's guilt may be reluctant to nullify the trial by finding the defendant
incompetent, and thus may be tempted to use a less stringent standard for competency.
95. 33 Wis. 2d 661, 148 N.W.2d 33 (1967). See pp. 733-34 supra. Such a hearing
would be similar in effect to a preliminary hearing in a felony case. If probable guilt is
found, the court proceeds to determine the competency issue. On the other hand, if
probable guilt is not found, the case is dismissed, but jeopardy would not attach and
the reinstitution of the charges at a later time would not be barred. Of course, if
charges were to be reinstituted while there remained doubt as to the defendant's compe-
tency, the state would still be forced to make a showing of probable guilt at a pretrial
hearing. Moreover, if the state was unable to show probable guilt after continually
reinstituting the charges, the defendant would be able to move to dismiss the indictment
or information as violative of due process.
96. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 alternative subsections (3), (4) (Proposed Of-
ficial Draft, 1962); note 66 supra and accompanying text; note 68 supra.
97. Foote, supra note 8, at 845. For the conclusion that providing counsel after
commitment is the best means to protect defendants from abuse, see Lewin, Disposition
of the Irresponsible: Protection Following Commitment, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 721 (1968).
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When a defendant is committed, the commitment should be -limited to a spe-
cified period of time. If competency is not restored within that period, or
if it becomes clear during that period that competency cannot be restored,
the defendant should be released or civilly committed. One study suggested
that a period of two years, with a possible six month extension, was a rea-
sonable period of 'time, while a more recent study has suggested a period
of six months,98 with a possible six month extension.9 9 Michigan has pro-
vided for a limit of eighteen months.100  In addition, commitment should
be terminated if the indictments against the defendant are dismissed. Since
there is no longer a legitimate state interest in confinement, -the defendant
should be released or civilly committed.
-(4) The decision to release or return for trial a committed defendant
should not be left solely to the discretion of the superintendent of the in-
stitution; periodic reviews should be required and procedures should be estab-
lished under which the defendant or his counsel can challenge continued
commitment. Although the limitations on the period for commitment that
are suggested above provide the defendant with a great deal of protection
from the potential abuses of indeterminate commitment, there is still the
danger that he is being unduly deprived of his liberty even under a commit-
ment of specified duration. The longer the period set for commitment, the
more likely it is that the defendant is being unnecessarily confined and the
98. GAP, supra note 9, at 41-42:
It is our belief that new techniques and drugs can bring most persons initially
found to be incompetent to a competent state well within six months. This
is the maximum length of time normally required at this time to treat most
civilly committed patients in hospitals. After six months of treatment the
vast majority of all incompetency cases will be in one of two categories: (a)
they will be competent to stand trial; or (b) they will be suffering from a
type of mental disability such as that due to gross mental retardation, brain
damage, or chronic deteriorated states which make it possible for the psychia-
trist to predict that the defendant will never regain competency. The first
group should, of course, stand trial. Criminal charges against this second
group should be dropped, and they should instead be subject to civil commit-
ment proceedings where their dangerousness should be reassessed to determine
the type of institutionalization, if any, which is required. Those persons who
will never return to competency and who pose no threat to themselves or the
community, should be released.
99. GAP, supra note 9, at 42:
There will be a small number of incompetency cases which do not fit into
either of these categories. After six months of treatment they will not be
competent to stand trial, nor will it be apparent that they can never return
to competency. For these few the judge should hold a hearing, and if indi-
cated, grant a six month extension of the initial treatment period. At the end
of the extension period, a total of twelve months treatment, the defendant
should be returned to trial or civilly committed to that institution which is
best equipped to treat him.
100. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972).
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greater the need for an inquiry into the defendant's condition and the treat-
ment he is receiving.. The court should conduct periodic inquiries and the
defendant or his counsel should be made aware of the procedures by which
to challenge continued commitment. If the defendant is shown to have re-
gained competency, or if there is not a substantial probability that he will
regain competency, or if he is not receiving the type of treatment required,
or if continued confinement is no longer necessary for treatment, the defend-
ant should be released from criminal commitment and discharged, tried,
treated, or civilly committted, as the case may be. Since in all cases we
are dealing with individuals who have not been found guilty of a crime, it
is imperative that any confinement and concomitant loss of liberty be kept
to the minimum -that is necessary to vindicate only the legitimate interests
of the state.110
A proposed statute along the following lines would incorporate these
limitations:
Proposed Statute
(1) If doubt is raised as to the defendant's competency to stand trial,
101. These suggested limitations would not contravene the holding in Jackson that
by subjecting the defendant to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more
stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged
with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization
without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity offered for release by
civil commitment statutes, the state deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment.
The Court's decision recognizes that the pendency of a criminal proceeding offers a
rational basis for distinguishing an incompetent defendant from other persons who are
mentally ill, only on the ground of an interest in his recovery and return to trial. See
Harvard Note, supra note 74, at 464. Thus, it requires that the same standards appli-
cable to civil commitment be applied to incompetency commitment when confinement is
indeterminate. Indeed, the Court emphasized that "[w]ere the State's factual premise
that Jackson's commitment is only temporary a valid one, this might well be a different
case." 406 U.S. at 725. The limitations suggested here, while continuing to draw a dis-
tinction between incompetency commitment and civil commitment, ensure that incompe-
tency commitment will not be indeterminate-indeed, that it cannot continue beyond
one year-and that such commitment will only continue when there is substantial prob-
ability that the defendant will recover competency and can be returned to trial. More-
over, the proposals require the state to show more than "only [the defendant's] inabil-
ity to stand trial." Id. at 727. It must also show that it is not unlikely that treat-
ment will restore competency, that confinement is necessary for that treatment, and
that the treatment required is in fact available and will be administered to the defend-
ant. Further, the defendant must be released if any of the conditions required for com-
mitment are no longer being met, and there is provision for institutional, periodic re-
view as well as procedures by which the defendant himself can inquire into the need
for continued commitment. Thus, the defendant would be subject to neither "a more
lenient commitment standard" nor "a more stringent standard of release than those gen-
erally applicable to all others [who are indeterminately committed but who are] not
charged with offenses." Id. at 730.
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the court shall first conduct the trial on the merits of the offense or offenses
charged and then, if the defendant has been found guilty, conduct a hear-
ing and make a determination on the defendant's competency to stand trial.
In conducting such a hearing the court may rely on its observations of the
conduct of the defendant during the trial on the merits, as well as upon
the testimony of experts introduced at the hearing. In all such proceed-
ings the defendant shall be represented by counsel. The court may order
the defendant temporarily committed for observation if, but only if, it con-
cludes that confinement is necessary and any examinations required cannot
be conducted on an outpatient basis; the defendant shall begin such tem-
porary commitment only if and when the staff of the institution can com-
mence its examination upon his arrival; upon completion of the examina-
tion the defendant shall be returned to the custody of the court to be confined
or released on bail pending a determination of his competency. In no
event shall any temporary commitment be for more than ten (10) days.
The defendant or his counsel may apply directly to the court for immediate
release if his examination is unduly delayed, and the defendant or his coun-
sel may at any time question the legality of his commitment by writ of habeas
corpus. If, at the hearing on competency the defendant is found to be com-
petent, the verdict will stand and he will be sentenced according to law; if the
defendant is found to be incompetent, the verdict will be set aside and treated
as a nullity and the court shall proceed to consider whether the defendant
should be committed, in order to restore his competency, under section (2).
Alternative: (1) If doubt is raised as to the defendant's competency
to stand trial, the court shall hold a hearing to establish whether it is prob-
able that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged. In
all such proceedings the defendant shall be represented by counsel. At the
conclusion of the hearing a finding shall be made on the issue of probable
guilt. If the finding is that the charges of the state are defective or in-
sufficient or not proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the indictment
or information shall be quashed and the defendant shall be discharged, sub-
ject to the right of the state to institute civil commitment proceedings. A
determination that the state has not proved probable guilt shall not cause
jeopardy to attach and shall not be a bar to reinstitution of the state's charges
at a later time. If the finding is that it is probable that the defendant com-
mitted the offense or offenses charged, the court shall then conduct a hear-
ing to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The court may
order the defendant temporarily committed for observation if but only if, it
concludes that confinement is necessary and any examinations required can-
not be conducted on an outpatient basis. The defendant shall begin such
temporary commitment only if and when the staff of the institution can
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commence its examination upon his arrival; upon completion of the ex-
amination the defendant shall be returned to the custody of the court to
be confined or released on bail pending a determination of his competency.
In no event shall any temporary commitment be for more than ten (10) days.
The defendant or his counsel may apply directly to the court for immediate
release if his examination is unduly delayed, and the defendant or his coun-
sel may at any time question the legality of his commitment by writ of
habeas corpus. If, at the hearing on competency, the defendant is found
to be competent, he shall be tried according to law; if the defendant is
found to be incompetent, the court shall proceed to consider whether the
defendant should be committed, in order to restore his competency, under
section (2).
(2) The court shall order commitment only if it finds that:
(a) it is not unlikely that the defendant, if given proper treatment,
will regain competency; and
(b) such treatment cannot be administered on an out-patient basis
or by a private physician and that confinement is necessary; and
(c) the type of treatment required is available and will be adminis-
tered at the institution to which the defendant is to be committed.
If all these conditions are not met, the court shall order the defendant released,
subject to the right of the state to institute civil commitment proceedings.
In any case in which the court orders the defendant released it may make
the further order that the defendant undergo outpatient observation and
treatment at a state institution or treatment by arrangement with a private doc-
tor, and the court shall make periodic inquiries into the defendant's progress
toward recovery of competency to stand trial. The court shall retain
jurisdiction over the charges and shall have the power to proceed to trial if
the defendant shall regain competency to stand trial; provided, that the
court shall dismiss the charges when it is of the view that so much time
has elapsed that it would be unjust to resume the criminal proceeding.
(3) No commitment, in order to restore competency, shall continue if
the charges against the defendant have been dismissed. Any commitment
made in accordance with section (2) shall be for six (6) months. After
six months, the court shall conduct a hearing, at which the defendant shall
be represented by counsel, to determine if the defendant is still incompetent
to stand trial. If the defendant is found to be competent, he shall be tried
according to law. If the defendant is found to be still incompetent and if
the court finds that there is not a substantial probability that he will ever
be restored to competency, he shall be released subject to the right of the
state to institute civil commitment proceedings. If the defendant is found
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to be still incompetent and if the court finds that there is a substantial prob-
ability that he can be restored to competency through continued treatment
and if the court further makes the findings required as a prerequisite to
commitment in section (2), then ,the court may order one six-month exten-
sion of the initial commitment period. If, after this six-month extension
the court, after a hearing at which the defendant shall be represented by
counsel, determines that the defendant is still incompetent to stand trial,
he shall be released, subject to the right of the state to institute civil commit-
ment proceedings. In no event shall any commitment be continued beyond
a period of twelve (12) months. The court shall retain jurisdiction over
the charges and shall have the power to proceed to trial if the defendant
shall regain competency to stand trial after his release from commitment;
provided, that the court shall dismiss the charges when it is of the view
that so much time has elapsed that it would be unjust to resume the criminal
proceeding.
(4) Whenever a defendant is committed in accordance with section (2)
the court shall conduct periodic inquiries to determine if there is a con-
tinued need for confinement and if there is a substantial probability that the
defendant will be restored to competency. Such inquiries may take the
form of written reports, at stated intervals, from the superintendent of the
institution and from the defendant's counsel. If it appears to the court
upon its own examination, or upon the application of the superintendent of
the institution, that the defendant has regained competency; or if it appears
that continued confinement for treatment is no longer necessary; or if it
appears that the defendant is not receiving the kind of treatment required
for recovery, then the court shall order a hearing, at which the defendant
shall be represented by counsel, to determine whether continued commit-
ment is warranted. If the defendant is found to be competent, he shall
be tried according to law; otherwise, the court shall proceed in accordance
with section (2).
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